Research by Accident

This paper deals with a key aspect of (uncertainty in) knowledge generation: unanticipated discoveries. The first part of the paper provides an illustration of what the author terms "research by accident", defined as a central cognitive device to generate unanticipated knowledge: in R&D for a new technological alternative as substitute to an old technology, scientists and engineers are inclined to narrow their vision, being preoccupied with simply accomplishing, with the new technology, what the old technology did. As very well documented in the case of nuclear weapons, such a cognitive bias leads to a sequence of unanticipated discoveries -- a process of research by accident which will subsequently reveal properties and characteristics of the technology which were not expected initially. One lesson of this paper is the importance of basic research as a source of information that one did not know was needed when it was first decided to deploy a new technology. The challenge is to improve ways of accessing existing knowledge at any one time so as to reduce the probability of surprise. The second part of the paper deals with situations where the scarce resource is no longer information but attention. As illustrated with the example of energy studies of the 1970s, the problem at hand deals with the efficiency of information distribution rather than generation. As pointed out by the author, it is necessary to make a difference between scientific information that exists somewhere and scientific information that is known in the right context and to the right people (the persons with the capacity to take action or to resist action) at the right time

More calculations about deterrence

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68274/2/10.1177_002200276500900104.pd

Entanglement between Demand and Supply in Markets with Bandwagon Goods

Whenever customers' choices (e.g. to buy or not a given good) depend on others choices (cases coined 'positive externalities' or 'bandwagon effect' in the economic literature), the demand may be multiply valued: for a same posted price, there is either a small number of buyers, or a large one -- in which case one says that the customers coordinate. This leads to a dilemma for the seller: should he sell at a high price, targeting a small number of buyers, or at low price targeting a large number of buyers? In this paper we show that the interaction between demand and supply is even more complex than expected, leading to what we call the curse of coordination: the pricing strategy for the seller which aimed at maximizing his profit corresponds to posting a price which, not only assumes that the customers will coordinate, but also lies very near the critical price value at which such high demand no more exists. This is obtained by the detailed mathematical analysis of a particular model formally related to the Random Field Ising Model and to a model introduced in social sciences by T C Schelling in the 70's.Comment: Updated version, accepted for publication, Journal of Statistical Physics, online Dec 201

Game Theoretical Interactions of Moving Agents

Game theory has been one of the most successful quantitative concepts to describe social interactions, their strategical aspects, and outcomes. Among the payoff matrix quantifying the result of a social interaction, the interaction conditions have been varied, such as the number of repeated interactions, the number of interaction partners, the possibility to punish defective behavior etc. While an extension to spatial interactions has been considered early on such as in the "game of life", recent studies have focussed on effects of the structure of social interaction networks. However, the possibility of individuals to move and, thereby, evade areas with a high level of defection, and to seek areas with a high level of cooperation, has not been fully explored so far. This contribution presents a model combining game theoretical interactions with success-driven motion in space, and studies the consequences that this may have for the degree of cooperation and the spatio-temporal dynamics in the population. It is demonstrated that the combination of game theoretical interactions with motion gives rise to many self-organized behavioral patterns on an aggregate level, which can explain a variety of empirically observed social behaviors

On the Potts model partition function in an external field

We study the partition function of Potts model in an external (magnetic) field, and its connections with the zero-field Potts model partition function. Using a deletion-contraction formulation for the partition function Z for this model, we show that it can be expanded in terms of the zero-field partition function. We also show that Z can be written as a sum over the spanning trees, and the spanning forests, of a graph G. Our results extend to Z the well-known spanning tree expansion for the zero-field partition function that arises though its connections with the Tutte polynomial

An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

"This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a 'guerilla warfare' strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a 'stochastic complete coverage' strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields." (author's abstract)"Dieser Artikel untersucht das Verhalten von Individuen in einem 'constant-sum Colonel Blotto'-Spiel zwischen zwei Spielern, bei dem die Spieler mit unterschiedlichen Ressourcen ausgestattet sind und die erwartete Anzahl gewonnener Schlachtfelder maximieren. Die experimentellen Ergebnisse bestätigen alle wichtigen theoretischen Vorhersagen. Im Durchgang, in dem wie in einer Auktion der Sieg in einem Schlachtfeld deterministisch ist, wenden die Spieler, die sich im Nachteil befinden, eine 'Guerillataktik' an, und verteilen ihre Ressourcen stochastisch auf eine Teilmenge der Schlachtfelder. Spieler mit einem Vorteil verwenden eine Strategie der 'stochastischen vollständigen Abdeckung', indem sie zufällig eine positive Ressourcenmenge auf allen Schlachtfeldern positionieren. Im Durchgang, in dem sich der Gewinn eines Schlachtfeldes probabilistisch wie in einer Lotterie bestimmt, teilen beide Spieler ihre Ressourcen gleichmäßig auf alle Schlachtfelder auf." (Autorenreferat

A Biased Review of Sociophysics

Various aspects of recent sociophysics research are shortly reviewed: Schelling model as an example for lack of interdisciplinary cooperation, opinion dynamics, combat, and citation statistics as an example for strong interdisciplinarity.Comment: 16 pages for J. Stat. Phys. including 2 figures and numerous reference